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Red Jan 1. 1861

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looks out over
Gettysburg

STRICTURES

ON THE

PHILADELPHIA

MISCHIANZA OR TRIUMPH

UPON LEAVING

America Unconquered.

ST. RICHARD'S
OF THE
PHILADELPHIA
MISSIONARY OF THE
ST. LEONARD
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

STRICTURES

ON THE
PHILADELPHIA
MISCHIANZA OR TRIUMPH
UPON LEAVING

America Unconquered.

WITH

EXTRACTS, containing the principal Part of a
LETTER, published in the "*American Crisis*."

In order to shew how far the King's Enemies think
his General deserving of Public Honours.

N. B. A flattering Account of this Mischianza was published in the *Philadelphia Gazette*, and copied into the *Morning Post* the 13th of *July* last; and a larger one by a still more flattering Panegyrist, may be found in the *Gentleman's Magazine* for *August* last.

By Israel Mauduit.

L O N D O N :

PRINTED FOR J. BEW, PATER-NOSTER-ROW.

M. DCC. LXXIX.

STRICTURES

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his General delivery of Public Honors.

Mr. A. has been accused of his villainy and has
listed in the Philadelphia Gazette, and copied into the
Massachusetts Gazette, and a large number of
a still more disgusting Libel, may be found in the
Gazette, and in the Libel.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. NEW, PATERNOSTER ROW.

MDCCLXXXII.

STRICTURES, &c.

IF Sir W——m H——e had thought fit quietly to resign his command, and been content to enjoy in privacy the fortune he had acquired, till the nation had in some measure digested the disgraces and losses we had suffered under his command in America; or till the dangers and calamities, which, in consequence of them, threaten us here at home, were passed over;—he might not then perhaps have been disturbed in his retirement.

But at a time when the British empire in America is funk, and when thou-

B

fands

fands and thousands of good subjects in both countries are ruined by its fall—at a time, when, with the loss of our Colonies, the empire here in Britain itself is shaken and endangered—at such a time of public calamity, when every good Englishman was trembling for the commonwealth—at such a time of distress, for a General to take to himself ovations and triumphs greater than the Duke of Marlborough, or any English commander ever thought of—to suffer himself to be crowned with laurels, and to have triumphal arches erected to his honour—is such an insult offered to our understandings, as cannot but raise in the mind of every man of sense, the highest degree of astonishment and indignation.

I do not at present bring any charge, or enquire *now* where we ought to fix the blame; but this we are sure of, that during the whole of G——l H——'s command, our attempts to subdue the rebellion have been every where unsuccessful;

cessful; the British arms have been continually disgraced, and the British empire in America is lost.

'Tis a Washington, ~~therefore~~, and not a H—e, that is triumphant. Yet the Victor General is content to enjoy his success in modest silence; while the Vanquished, instead of hiding his head in obscurity, most preposterously covers it with laurels.

It is no unusual artifice for a Governor, when leaving his command, to get his creatures and dependents to set on foot an address of thanks: and from a little West India island, which none but its own planters know any thing about, this may pass here in England as a proof of his good behaviour. But could a Commander in Chief, in a war of so much importance—after the nation had been put to the expence of so many millions to no purpose—and when so many thousands of good subjects are ruined by the miscarriage of it—could *he* think, that we should lose all sense of the public calamities,

calamities, because he expresses no feelings for them? Did he think we should imagine that America was still ours, because he shewed no shame, but had a triumph made for him upon the loss of it? Or that a three years series of perpetual disgraces would not be seen through all his ovations and triumphal arches?

How much soever it may be in a General's power to represent his army as greater or less, to suit any present occasion, yet one thing at least is certain, that G——l H——e was furnished with a force abundantly sufficient to have quelled the rebellion. Both friends and foes agree in this, that from the year 1776 he never met Mr. Washington but with an army superior in *number*, as well as in goodness, to that of the enemy which was opposed to him: yet, in the course of three campaigns, he never thought proper to fight Mr. Washington, but once; and then did not chuse to pursue the victory which his troops had gained for him. Either, therefore, the British

troops must have been the greatest of all poltroons, who were unable to contend with an inferior number of new-raised, half-clothed, and half-armed American militia ;—or else there must have been an extreme deficiency in our Generalship. Whichsoever of these may have been the case, what ground can either of them afford for a triumph ? Or upon what foundation could a General—who had seen the British arms endure innumerable disgraces under his command—who had suffered himself to be ingloriously driven out of Boston—and who, after having been beaten at Trenton and at Princeton, was still more ingloriously driven out of the Jerseys—whose troops, by bravely beating in the rebel outposts, had often pointed out to him the way to victory, while he never chose to follow it ; but invariably allowed the Americans to march off unmolested, and unpursued—who had suffered himself to be surprised at German-town, and had seen his army thereby brought to the brink

of destruction, from which it was rescued by the single bravery and good conduct of General Musgrave—who had been baffled and defeated in all his attempts, and out-generaled even by a man that was none—and who now, after three years command, found himself much less able to suppress the rebellion, than he was the day he landed on Staten Island?—Upon what pretence, I say, could this gentleman suffer himself to be crowned with laurels which he never won? Or encourage the *dedicating* a triumphal arch with plumes and military trophies to his honour, without his having once had the honour of a conquest?

A General with so extensive and uncontrolled a command, cannot want flatterers enough among his numerous dependants, who may have been promoted by his favour, or possibly enriched by his connivance.

But when so very extraordinary a method has been taken to persuade us of the high estimation in which he is held
for

for his military abilities *, it is a piece of justice due to the public, to produce the opinion which the rest of the Americans entertain of him—so very different from that which is here given by his flatterers and dependants.

The very high encomiums upon G—l H—e, which for months together after his appointment were printing in the news-papers, had raised in the minds of the Americans the greatest opinion of his military abilities; and upon the arrival of the troops in 1776, had rendered him an object of reverence to the King's friends there, and of terror to his enemies. The strong prepossessions which the Loyalists had imbibed in his favour, would not allow them to suppose that he did not see the advantages he then had over the Rebels; and the many opportunities for crushing the rebellion, which presented themselves in the course

* Even on the admission tickets, the General's crest was encircled with military trophies.

of that campaign. They found, however, that he permitted every one of them to pass away unimproved. If *they* could see these advantages, it could not be supposed but that a General of such consummate knowledge must see much more of them, and know much better than they how to make use of them—if he had chose it. Hence they generally concluded, that he must have received secret orders not to hurt the Americans. And with many of them this suspicion is not eradicated to this day. But whatever may have been their sentiments about the *cause* of his not conquering, scarce a man of them had a doubt but that he might have done it.

By the end of the year 1776, this high reputation which the General had brought over with him, was wearing out. Many of the Americans became better informed; and the more discerning part reflected, that no minister could have dared to give such orders.

The

The instant they conceived that his conduct proceeded from himself, and was the effect of his own choice, and not of orders, they found themselves at no loss in forming their judgment. The wretched use he had made of his supposed superiority of Generalship, and of his real superiority of force, had gradually opened men's eyes, and cured them of all their prejudices in his favour. The friends of government, with indignation, saw that he *did* nothing; and they in charity perhaps might wish silently to think, what its enemies there openly say, that he *knew* nothing,

These high encomiums on the General had been the puffs of their own allies here in England; and therefore among the Rebels this deception lasted the longer: but having once got over it, they were the first to renounce it: and Rebels and Royalists both at length concurred in the same opinion. The words of a letter addressed to him by the former are, *The character of Sir W—m H—e*
has

has undergone some extraordinary revolutions since his arrival in America: it is now fixed and known; and we have nothing to hope from your candour, or to fear from your capacity. The loyal part of the Americans equally feel this revolution in their sentiments: and after having seen the rebel army nine * times successively permitted to go off with impunity, and unpursued, they would perhaps only wish to transpose the expressions, and say “that they had nothing to hope from his capacity, and every thing to fear from what is here called his candour.”

Should the reader wish to see the grounds of this change of sentiment in the minds of the American loyalists, he will find them in four excellent letters, signed *Matter of Fact*, printed in the Public Advertiser of the 25th of May, and the 5th, 11th, and 13th of June last. They are manifestly written by a very intelligent eye witness, who was present with

* See these instances enumerated in the Postscript.

the army, and acquainted with all its proceedings. They are such as ought to be read by every good Englishman, who wishes to understand the subject; and with a supplemental one in the Morning Post of the 15th of July, are well worth reprinting, now that gentlemen are come to town, who never see the daily papers while they are in the country. If these should not easily be found, the letter signed *Lucius*, in the Morning Chronicle of the 11th of January last, contains many particulars of the same sort.

But as the good opinion of the King's loyal subjects in America seems not to have made a principal object of this gentleman's concern, it may carry more conviction perhaps to produce the opinion which the King's enemies entertain of him; and give the sentiments of the Rebels themselves, who, as the reader will see, acknowledge that through the whole of the campaign of 1776, Mr. H—e's army consisted of nearly double the number

ber

ber of that which Mr. Washington opposed to him—that America was then young and unskilled, whereas he was in high reputation, and his military knowledge was *then* supposed to be compleat—that his troops had arrived in full numbers, and in full spirits: he was then, they say, formidable; and, in effect, own that he had only to begin to make an end of them—that their fate was suspended by a thread—and that, they were saved as it were, by miracle. After all these acknowledgments of his mercy, the General might have hoped, that these men, who had been so often spared by him, and constantly suffered to withdraw themselves, whither they pleased, from every dangerous situation, would at least have treated him with respect. But as men who have broke through their oaths, and cast off their allegiance, naturally throw away with it their gratitude, and every other sense of obligation, the return which they make to the General, who they in effect acknowledge
might

might so often have crushed them, is to treat him with every kind of indignity; and to speak of him in terms of the utmost scorn and contempt.

The *American Crisis* is a work which has been published in numbers; and has come out upon particular occasions, when the Congress has judged it necessary to rouse and animate their adherents in their resistance against this country. It professes to be written by the author of *Common Sense*. Some have given it to Dr. Franklin, others to Mr. Adams.

It is now known to be written under the patronage of the Congress, and the instructions of their capital and best informed leaders.

The fifth number was published in March last, when the Congress were in expectation of some conciliatory offers being brought to them from Great Britain; and were apprehensive that their people might be weary of the war, and induced to accept them.

The

The arguments used to prevent this are, " That although at first the British arms were formidable, and G——l H——e might then have easily subdued them, yet now they have found him out :—That they had nothing to fear from his capacity ; and that Mr. Washington has constantly out-generaled him :—That if in the year 1776, when he was in his strongest state, and they in their weakest, he did not then take the way to conquer, they had nothing to fear from him now, when their force was greater, and when his was rather less, and his credit with them none at all.

" That by giving them three years training, he had taught them their business ; and they were now able to meet their enemy upon any ground ; and therefore had no need to treat."

This first part is called, *A Letter to General Sir W——m H——e*. The other two parts are, *An Address to the Americans* ; and *A Plan for maintaining a Standing*

Standing Army, superior to any Force which shall be brought against them.

Great part of the book is too full of the most virulent invective against the King, the Parliament, and the English nation, to bear re-printing; but will abundantly satisfy the reader, that it can be the work of no one but a most strenuous advocate for American Independence, and a man full of the most rancorous malice against this country.

A confederate here in England, if he please, may reprint the whole book, containing thirty-two pages. I shall only give some extracts from the first part of it, to shew the opinion which our enemies have of the General's conduct, and how little they must think him deserving of this public triumph.

The title is :

“THE

" THE

" AMERICAN CRISIS,

" NUMBER V.

" ADDRESSED TO

" General Sir W———M H——E.

" By the Author of COMMON SENSE.

" LANCASTER, Printed;

" HARTFORD, Re-printed;

" And sold by WATSON and GOODWIN, near the
" Great Bridge. 1778."

The reader will make the proper allowance for the boasts of party; and will observe, that the author continually gives his leaders the credit of after-wisdom and after-design, which they never had the least thought of before the events.

It

It sets out with some affected wit and ill-judged abuse; and then after some more personal charges, the letter goes on :

“ That a man, whose soul is absorbed
 “ in the low traffic of vulgar vice, is in-
 “ capable of moving in any superior re-
 “ gion, is clearly shown in you by the
 “ event of every campaign;—your mili-
 “ tary exploits have been without plan,
 “ object, or decision. Can it be possible
 “ that you or your employers can sup-
 “ pose the possession of Philadelphia to
 “ be any ways equal to the expence or
 “ expectation of the nation which sup-
 “ ports you ? What advantages does
 “ England derive from any atchive-
 “ ments of yours ? To her it is perfectly
 “ indifferent what place you are in, so
 “ long as the business of conquest is un-
 “ performed, and the charge of main-
 “ taining you remains the same.

“ If the principal events of the three
 “ campaigns

" campaigns be attended to, the balance
 " will appear strongly against you at the
 " close of each; but the last, in point of
 " importance to us, hath exceeded the
 " former two. It is pleasant to look
 " back on dangers past, and equally as
 " pleasant to meditate on present ones,
 " when the way out begins to appear.
 " That period is now arrived, and the
 " long doubtful winter of war is changed
 " to the sweeter prospects of victory and
 " joy. At the close of the campaign in
 " seventy-five, you were obliged to re-
 " treat from Boston. In the summer,
 " seventy-six, you appeared with a nu-
 " merous fleet and army in the harbour
 " of New York. *By what miracle the*
 " *Continent was preserved in that season of*
 " *danger is a subject of admiration.* If,
 " instead of wasting your time against
 " Long Island, you had run up the
 " North River, and landed any where
 " above New York, the consequence
 " must have been, that either you would
 " have compelled General Washington
 " to

“to fight you with very unequal num-
 “bers, or he must have suddenly evacu-
 “ated the city, with the loss of nearly
 “all the stores of the army, or have sur-
 “rendered for want of provisions ; the
 “situation of the place naturally pro-
 “ducing one or other of these events*.

* The map will convince the reader of the just-
 ness of this observation ; and both friends and ene-
 mies at the time concurred in making it. For weeks
 together, after the General had suffered the rebels to
 escape from Long Island, where the loyal part of the
 Americans expected day after day, that he would
 land at New Rochelle, and march to the north ri-
 ver, while his fleet sailed up it. All men saw (and
 some, it has been publickly said, told him) that he
 would thereby shut up the rebel army in the penin-
 sula of New York ; and were wondering and la-
 menting that he did not instantly do it, and thereby
 retrieve the false step he had made. Yet the General
 lay quiet in his camp at New-town for above a fort-
 night, while his enemies were recovering from their
 terror. And many of his officers, it is said, with their
 glasses, saw them carry off cannon and stores from
 New York cross the east river, to guard as well as
 they could against the danger.

“ The preparations made to defend
 “ New York were, nevertheless, wise
 “ and military ; because your forces were
 “ then at sea, their numbers uncertain ;
 “ storms, sickness, or a variety of acci-
 “ dents might have disabled their com-
 “ ing, or so diminished them on their
 “ passage, that those which survived
 “ would have been incapable of the
 “ campaign with any prospect of success ;
 “ in which case the defence would have
 “ been sufficient, and the place pre-
 “ served : for cities that have been raised
 “ from nothing with an infinitude of
 “ labour and expence, are not to be
 “ thrown away on any probability of
 “ their being taken. On these grounds
 “ the preparations made to maintain
 “ New York were as judicious as the
 “ retreat afterwards. *While you in the*
 “ *interim let slip the very OPPORTUNITY*
 “ *which seemed to put conquest in your power.*

“ Through the whole of that cam-
 “ paign you had nearly double the forces
 I “ which

“ *which General Washington immediately*
 “ *commanded.* The principal plan at
 “ that time on our part, was to wear
 “ away the season with as little loss as
 “ possible, and to raise the army for the
 “ next year. Long Island, New York,
 “ Forts Washington and Lee, were not
 “ defended (after your superior force was
 “ known) under any expectation of their
 “ being finally maintained, but as a
 “ range of out-works, in the attacking
 “ of which your time might be wasted,
 “ your numbers reduced, and your va-
 “ nity amused, by possessing them on
 “ our retreat. It was intended to have
 “ withdrawn the garrison from Fort
 “ Washington, after it had answered
 “ the former of these purposes; but the
 “ fate of that day put a prize into your
 “ hands, without much honour to your-
 “ selves.

“ Your progress through the Jerseys
 “ was accidental: you had it not even
 “ in contemplation, or you would not
 C 3 “ have

“ have sent so principal a part of your
 “ force to Rhode Island before hand.
 “ The utmost hope of America, in the
 “ year seventy-six, reached no higher
 “ than that she might not *then* be con-
 “ quered. She had no expectation of
 “ defeating you in the campaign. Even
 “ the most cowardly Tory allowed, that
 “ could she withstand the shock of that
 “ Summer, her independence would be
 “ past a doubt. You had then greatly
 “ the advantage of her ; you were for-
 “ midable ; your military knowledge
 “ was *supposed to be compleat ; your fleets*
 “ *and forces arrived without any accident ;*
 “ *you had nothing to do but to begin, and*
 “ *your chance lay in the first vigorous onset,*

“ America was young and unskilled.
 “ She was obliged to trust her defence to
 “ time and practice ; and hath, by mere
 “ dint of perseverance, maintained her
 “ cause, and brought her enemy to a
 “ condition in which she is now capable
 “ of meeting him on any ground.

“ It

“ It is remarkable, that in the cam-
 “ paign of seventy-six, you gained no
 “ more, notwithstanding your great
 “ force, than what was given you by
 “ consent or evacuation, except Fort
 “ Washington; while every advantage
 “ obtained by us was by fair and hard
 “ fighting. The defeat of Sir Peter
 “ Parker was complete. The conquest
 “ of the Hessians by the remains of a
 “ retreating army, which but a few days
 “ before you affected to despise*, is an
 “ instance of heroic perseverance very
 “ seldom to be met with; and the vic-
 “ tory

* It did not suit this author's argument to say, whom you mercifully spared; though, in the House of Commons, the General valued himself upon his mercy. And it will be hard to find in history so striking an instance. The words of the gazette are: “ *All these motions plainly indicating the enemy's design to avoid coming to action, I did not think the driving their rear guard further back an object of the least consequence.*” That is, “ finding them now the fifth time

" tory over the British troops at Prince
 " town, by a harraſſed and weary party,
 " who had been engaged the day before,
 " and marched all night without re-
 " freſhment, is attended with ſuch a
 " ſcene of circumſtances, and ſuperiority
 " of Generalſhip, as will ever give it a
 " place on the firſt line in the hiſtory of
 " great actions.

" When I look back on the gloomy
 " days of laſt winter, *and ſee America*
 " *ſuſpended by a thread*, I feel a triumph
 " of joy at the recollection of her de-

diſpoſed to go off without fighting, I did not think
 it of the leaſt conſequence to prevent them; but per-
 mitted them to ſcramble over the north river as they
 could—to fly a hundred miles over the Jerſeys half
 purſued, and then to croſs the Delaware, and get to
 Philadelphia, without any moleſtation."

In all other wars, a General's finding that his ene-
 my wiſhed to go off without fighting, has been
 thought a reaſon for preſſing him ſo much the more:
 In the American war it is given as a reaſon for not
 preſſing him at all.

" livery,

“ livery, and a reverence for the cha-
 “ racters which snatched her from de-
 “ struction, To doubt now would be a
 “ species of infidelity ; and to forget the
 “ instruments which saved us then,
 “ would be ingratitude.

* * * *

* * * *

“ Let me ask, Sir, what great ex-
 “ ploits have you performed ? Through
 “ all the variety of changes and oppor-
 “ tunities, which this war hath pro-
 “ duced, I know of no one action of
 “ yours that can be stiled masterly. You
 “ have moved in and out, backward and
 “ forward, round and round, as if valor
 “ consisted in a military jig. The his-
 “ tory and figure of your movements
 “ would be truly ridiculous, could they
 “ be justly delineated. They resemble
 “ the labours of a puppy pursuing his
 “ tail ; the end is still at the same dis-
 “ tance

“ tance, and all the turnings round must
 “ be done over again *.

“ There has been something unmili-
 “ tarily passive in you, from the time of
 “ your passing the Schuylkill, and get-
 “ ting possession of Philadelphia, to the
 “ close of the campaign. You mistook
 “ a trap for a conquest; the probabi-
 “ lity of which had been made known
 “ to Europe, and the edge of your
 “ triumph taken off by our own infor-
 “ mation long before.

“ Having got you into this situation,
 “ a scheme for a general attack upon

* I do not adopt this language of contempt; but if his panegyrist had not told us, could it have been thought possible, that this gentleman, a month after this publication, should have had a fame spangled with stars, stuck upon the top of his triumphal arch, blowing from her trumpet in letters of light: “*Tes lauriers sont immortels.*” And not content with this earth’s being filled with the sound of his fame, he was even powdered with stars, to tell us that it reaches up to the heavens.

“ you

“ you at German-town was carried into
 “ execution on the Fourth of October;
 “ and though the success was not equal
 “ to the excellence of the plan, yet the
 “ attempting it proved the genius of
 “ America to be on the rise, and her
 “ power approaching to superiority.
 “ The obscurity of the morning was
 “ your best friend; for a fog is always
 “ favourable to a hunted enemy. Some
 “ weeks after this you likewise planned
 “ an attack on General Washington,
 “ while at Whitemarsh; marched out
 “ with infinite parade; but on finding
 “ him preparing to attack you, the next
 “ morning you prudently cut about,
 “ and retreated to Philadelphia with all
 “ the precipitation of a man conquered
 “ in imagination.

“ Immediately after the battle of Ger-
 “ man-town, the probability of Bur-
 “ goyne's defeat gave a new policy to
 “ affairs in Pennsylvania; and it was
 “ judged

“ judged most consistent with the general
 “ safety of America to wait the issue of
 “ the northern campaign. Slow and
 “ sure is sound work. The news of
 “ that victory arrived in our camp on
 “ the 18th of October, and no sooner
 “ did the shout of joy, and the report of
 “ the thirteen cannon reach your ears,
 “ than you resolved upon a retreat, and
 “ the next day, that is on the 19th,
 “ withdrew your drooping army in Phi-
 “ ladelphia. This movement was evi-
 “ dently dictated by fear, and carried
 “ with it a positive confession, that you
 “ dreaded a second attack. It was hid-
 “ ing yourself among women * and chil-

* Should the reader ask, what it was that the Ge-
 neral at last did among them? his panegyrist has
 here told us, “ He bounced off with his bombs and
 burning hearts, set upon the pillars of his triumphal
 arch, which, at the proper time of the show, burst out
 in a shower of squibs and crackers, and other fire-
 works, to the delectable amazement of Miss Craig,
 Miss Chew, Miss Redman, and all the other misses,
 dressed out as the fair damsels of the blended rose,
 and of the burning mountain, for this farce of
 knight-errantry.”

“ dren

"dren, and sleeping away the choicest
 "part of a campaign in expensive inac-
 "tivity. An army in a city can never
 "be a conquering army. The situation
 "admits only of defence, It is mere
 "shelter; and every military power in
 "Europe will conclude you to be even-
 "tually defeated.

"The time when you made this re-
 "treat, was the very time you ought to
 "have fought a battle, in order to put
 "yourself in a condition of recovering
 "in Pennsylvania what you had lost at
 "Sarratoga; and the reason why you
 "did not, must be either prudence or
 "c——e; the former supposes your
 "inability, and the latter needs no ex-
 "planation. I draw no conclusions,
 "Sir, but such as are naturally deduced
 "from known or visible facts, and such
 "as will always have a being while the
 "facts which produced them remain un-
 "altered."

"Lancaster,

"March 28, 1778."

Such are the sentiments which the Americans entertain of this gentleman, and so great is the contempt they express of him. It might have been thought impossible, but the General has hit upon the single means of increasing it; and that was by this ill-timed and preposterous medley of a triumph. His enemies, we see, charge him with sleeping away the best part of the campaign: his friends perhaps may wish, that all this raree show had passed only in a dream: for no man, they may judge, in his waking thoughts, ought ever to have admitted it.

What would not have been said of the duke of Marlborough's vanity, if, after forty thousand enemies killed and taken at the battle of Blenheim, he had encouraged his officers and dependents to dedicate to him a triumphal arch, and had employed even the *enemies* standards taken in battle, in forming an avenue for himself and his fellow conquerors to have walked through?

What

What then are we to think of a beaten General's debasing the King's ensigns (for he had none of his enemies) by planting all the colours of the army in a grand avenue of three hundred feet in length, lined with the King's troops, between two triumphal arches, for himself and his brother to march along in pompous procession, followed by a numerous train of attendants, with seven filken knights of the blended rose, and seven more of the burning mountain, and their fourteen Turkey dressed damsels, to an area of 150 yards square, lined also with the King's troops, for the exhibition of a tilt and tournament, or mock fight of old chivalry, in honour of this triumphant hero *; and all this sea and land-

* See a list of the seven knights of the blended rose, all armed in silk and taffety, who so desperately maintained in combat the wit and beauty of their fair damsels, against the seven terrible knights of the burning mountain, fighting in honour of theirs; with the colours and trappings of the horses, and the mottos and devices, and names, and colours of the riders.

ovation made—not in consequence of an uninterrupted succession of victories, like those of the duke of Marlborough—not after the conquest of Canada by a Wolfe, a Townshend, and an Amherst; or after the much more valuable conquest of all the French provinces and possessions in India, under the *wise and active* general Coote—but after thirteen provinces wretchedly lost, and a three years series of ruinous disgraces and defeats.

POST.

P O S T S C R I P T.

IT is said that the Rebel army has nine times successively been permitted to go off unpursued.

They who were present, and knew the country reckon up more than nineteen opportunities lost, in which the Rebel army might have been destroyed; but I am led to that number by a letter in a morning paper of the 11th of December last, which particularizes so many instances of the same sort.

In the attack of trenches the troops behind them suffer little in the beginning of the action; and the principal loss falls upon the assailants, while they are marching up to them: but this loss is amply compensated by the much greater destruction of the enemy in the rout and pursuit, after the trenches are

D forced.

forced. General H—e, who values himself upon his mercy, has some times over ruled this disposition so far as to order the King's troops upon the *losing part* of the attack, in forcing their way up to the enemies trenches ; but never had cruelty enough to suffer the Rebels to be exposed to the rout and pursuit, upon their being driven out of them.

If this had happened once or twice only we might have imputed it to accident :—had it been suffered three or four times, we might have suspected and lamented some failure in the military capacity :—but when we have seen the same thing happen, and the same manoeuvres practised nine times over—when, in the course of three years, the royal army has never once been permitted to rout and pursue—it must require a great extent of charity indeed to make us impute this either to accident or incapacity.

The

The LETTER is as follows :

“ Friday 11 Dec. 1778.

“ Mr. EDITOR,

“ IN your account of the debate on
 “ Friday last, I see that Sir W——m
 “ H—e expresses a desire that an enquiry
 “ should take place, not only for the sa-
 “ tisfaction of the house, but of the na-
 “ tion at large. It will greatly contribute
 “ to the nation’s satisfaction, if he will
 “ be so good as to explain to us a
 “ very remarkable circumstance in the
 “ conduct of the American war, which
 “ never has been known in any other.

“ In every one of the successful at-
 “ tacks which our troops, with so much
 “ bravery have made upon their enemy,
 “ they have always been kept back from
 “ pursuing, and never once been per-
 “ mitted to improve the advantages they
 “ might have gained.

“ At

“ At Bunker’s Hill, the rebels only re-
 “ treat was over a narrow causeway ; and
 “ had they been pursued, as General
 “ Clinton is said to have advised, num-
 “ bers of them must have been destroyed,
 “ or taken.—But this was one of the
 “ least of the errors of that day.

“ At Long Island, the troops very suc-
 “ cessfully fought their way up to the
 “ rebel camp, and expressed the utmost
 “ eagerness to storm it, when the Gene-
 “ ral sent repeated orders for them to de-
 “ sist from the attempt ; although he
 “ himself was of opinion, that it would
 “ have succeeded. Even when the whole
 “ column of the troops was come up,
 “ they were restrained for three days from
 “ forcing the rebel camp, though Mr.
 “ Washington *, and his whole army
 “ must

* By the General’s telling us that Putnam com-
 manded in the lines, we might be led to suppose that
 Washington was not there. But it was well known
 that he was present all the time ; and after three
 days,

“ must have been taken, or destroyed in
“ consequence of it.

“ After the rebels had been suffered to
“ escape to New York, instead of in-
“ stantly pursuing them in that state of
“ trepidation they were then in, the ar-
“ my lay quiet in their camp in Long
“ Island for sixteen days, till the rebels
“ had time to recover themselves from
“ their fright, and prepare for their de-
“ fence.

“ When at length the army landed in
“ the island of New York, the Ameri-
“ cans almost all of them made their
“ escape, without being pursued.

“ At Kingsbridge, the Gazette tells
“ us, they quitted their position *with*
“ *some precipitation*, although without any
“ one's pursuing them.

days, when the boats were passing backward and
forward all night long in carrying the army over the
ferry, he went off in one of the last,

“ At

“ At the White Plains, the troops, in
 “ defiance of the enemy’s fire, marched
 “ through the river, possessed themselves
 “ of one hill, and attacked and routed
 “ the enemy on another; *and rushing on*
 “ *them drove them from their works*; which
 “ the Gazette says, *were very material*
 “ *posts*; and the Hessian grenadiers advanced
 “ *to the heights within cannon shot of the*
 “ *entrenchments*; yet, far from improv-
 “ ing these advantages, the rest of the
 “ army, we are told, *did not move*, but
 “ remained in their camp for four days
 “ together, till at length the rebels, *hav-*
 “ *ing intelligence by a deserter of their dan-*
 “ *ger*, most prudently evacuated their camp.

“ They left, we are told, a strong rear
 “ guard, at only a mile’s distance; *but*
 “ *the driving them farther back was not*
 “ *thought an object of the least consequence*.
 “ Yet General Lee, while he was a pri-
 “ soner at New York, is said to have
 “ often acknowledged, that if the Ame-
 “ ricans had been attacked in their camp,
 “ or

“ or pursued after their retreat, their
 “ army must have been totally ruined.

“ After their running out of Fort
 “ Lee, when the Rebels were flying across
 “ the Jerseys, and Lord Cornwallis was
 “ in close pursuit of them, and might by
 “ himself alone have had the honour of
 “ destroying them, he was stopped short
 “ in his pursuit (*by orders not to advance*
 “ *beyond Brunswick*) till the General him-
 “ self came up. He did come up, at
 “ his own leisure, five days after; and
 “ thereby gave the enemy five days re-
 “ spite to escape over the Delaware at
 “ theirs.

“ The Americans, on the other hand,
 “ did not neglect to improve the single
 “ advantage they gained at Trenton;
 “ but pushed on, and drove the King’s
 “ troops out of Prince Town, the very
 “ place where that day month Lord
 “ Cornwallis might have overtaken and
 “ destroyed them, if the General had

“ not stopped him in his pursuit. But
 “ I wish to draw a veil over the shame-
 “ ful manner in which we were driven
 “ out of the Jerseys.

“ During all the time of General
 “ H—’s command, he has chosen to
 “ give the enemy battle but once, and
 “ that was at Brandywine. Yet there
 “ too, after the troops had gained the
 “ victory, and Washington and his ar-
 “ my, in the utmost confusion, were
 “ fled to Philadelphia—there was no
 “ pursuit, and the army remained inac-
 “ tive for five days together, till the Re-
 “ bels should have recovered from their
 “ consternation, and sent off their can-
 “ non and stores; yet a well known let-
 “ ter from a French officer serving a-
 “ mong them, says, that they might then
 “ also have been ruined.

“ At German Town, the General, far
 “ from seeking to give battle to the ene-
 “ my, suffered himself to be surprised,
 “ and

“ and might have lost his army, if Co-
 “ lonel Musgrave had not thrown him-
 “ self into a strong stone house, and, by
 “ resolutely defending it, given time to
 “ the troops to recover themselves. After
 “ this they easily defeated their enemy,
 “ but were not permitted to pursue,
 “ which the same French officer writes
 “ must have been fatal to them.

“ In short, during the whole course
 “ of the war, the General has fought
 “ just enough to secure good winter quar-
 “ ters at New York and Philadelphia—
 “ has often made his troops force their
 “ way up to the enemy, but then they
 “ have invariably been kept back, and
 “ never suffered to improve the advan-
 “ tages they had gained.

“ I leave your readers to make their
 “ own reflections, but such are the facts.

“ Had the General made use of any
 “ one of the opportunities, which offer-

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“ ed

“ ed in the year 1776, for inclosing and
 “ cutting off the whole rebel army, I
 “ do not say, as many do, that he would
 “ have made an end of the war too soon;
 “ but this I say, and all the Americans,
 “ Rebels as well as Royalists, agree in
 “ this, that he would soon have made
 “ an end of the war.

CATO.”

F I N I S.